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ABSTRACT
This paper considers firms which compete under Cournot assumptions and in-
corporate social responsibility to the evaluation of their results. In our model a
socially responsible firm is one which takes into account not only its profits, but also
it internalizes its own share of externality and is sensitive to consumer surplus.
The analysis of the equilibria to which the firms will eventually arrive is ad-
dressed in a framework where the results of the strategic decisions of the firms depend
on a future uncertain event and no information about the probability distribution
is available.
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RESUMEN
En este trabajo se analiza el efecto de la inclusio´n de objetivos de responsabilidad
social en un modelo de empresas que compiten bajo los supuestos de Cournot. En nuestro
modelo una empresa socialmente responsable es aquella que no solo tiene en cuenta sus
beneficios, sino que tambie´n tiene en cuenta las externalidades positivas generadas por el
excedente del consumidor.
El ana´lisis de los equilibrios a los que pueden llegar las empresas se realiza en un
contexto de incertidumbre. Los resultados de las decisiones estrate´gicas de las empresas
dependen de la realizacio´n de un escenario futuro y no se dispone de informacio´n sobre
las probabilidades de ocurrencia de los posibles escenarios.
Palabras clave: Equilibrios de Pareto, Juegos de Cournot , Incertidumbre, Actitud ante
el riesgo, Responsabilidad social.
JEL classification: D43, D81, L10.
XXII Jornadas de ASEPUMA y X Encuentro Internacional
Anales de ASEPUMA n 22:1302
2
Equilibria for socially responsible firms
1 Introduction
In recent years, consumers have become increasingly aware of the role firms play
within the social context. For that reason, firms now increasingly try to become so-
cially responsible. At the same time, the features of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) and its impact on firm performance, especially in the field of management
sciences and economics of organizations, has been receiving considerable attention
in the academic community, from the CSR construct in the 1950s (Bowen, 1953)
to empirical investigations on the relationship between CSR and corporate finan-
cial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2001) and, then, to formal modeling of CSR
(Baron, 2001, 2007; Calveras et al., 2007; Giovanni and Giacinta, 2007). A review
of the theoretical and empirical economic literature on CSR behaviors is Crifo and
Forget (2013). Another interesting review is Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012),
where the synthesis of diverse strands of the expanding CSR literature is presented.
One way to analyze the effects of strategic CSR is to introduce into the utility
function of the social firm the excess of cost which depends on the level of CSR
undertaken by the firm (Ni et al. 2010; Manasakis et al. 2013). A different point of
view is to consider that CRS efforts induces no additional cost to the firms. In this
approach, as a way to incorporate the social goal to the strategic model, a share of
consumer’s surplus is introduced into the utility function of the social firm (Goering
2007, Lambertini and Tampieri 2010, Kopel and Brand 2011).
The model analyzed in this paper is located in this last approach. We consider
a mixed duopoly in which the social firm internalizes its own share of externality
and is sensitive to consumer surplus in a decisional context in which both firms face
an uncertain demand.
Specifically, we address situations where a profit-maximizing firm competes
against a socially responsible firm in a linear homogenous-product duopoly. In con-
trast to the profit-maximizing firm, the social responsible firm takes into account
not only its profits but also a share of consumer surplus. One important difference
with the above mentioned papers is that in our model the utility of the social firm
is represented by a bi-objective function.
In addition, we introduce demand uncertainty into the model. In the literature
on mixed oligopoly we find some papers in which this issue is considered. Thus,
Lu and Poddar (2006) analyze a two-stage capacity choice game in mixed duopoly
under demand uncertainty, where the firms simultaneously choose the output to
produce in stage 2, after the resolution of uncertainty. Anam et al. (2007) analyze
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demand uncertainty in a mixed oligopoly model in a stochastic environment. They
assume that uncertainty is resolved after the leader’s commitment to output, but
before the follower firm takes its output decision.
In our model, uncertainty in the demand is originated from the fact that dif-
ferent future scenarios are possible and the firms have to make their strategic deci-
sions before uncertainty is resolved. However, when an additional social objective is
present there may be other sources of uncertainty. For instance, consider a setting
in which consumers could show two different behaviors, social responsible and non-
social responsible behavior. If consumers know that the firm is socially responsible,
they might be willing to pay a higher reservation price. If the firm is not socially
responsible, the reservation price is lower and the market is bigger, given that lower
prices could attract more consumers. Assuming linear demand functions we could
say that the demand function for socially responsible behavior presents both higher
intercept and slope in absolute values than the demand function for non-social re-
sponsible behavior. The problem in a mixed duopoly is that consumers face different
kinds of firms which in turn implies that firms do not know which kind of consumers
they are going to find. Therefore, firms face demand uncertainty.
In order to perform our study, we take as a starting point the results presented
in Caraballo et al. (2014), where a Cournot duopoly under demand uncertainty is
analyzed. We show that the consideration of a social objective modeled as a function
which is increasing with respect to the total quantity in the market, yields new
equilibria from those obtained for profit-maximizing firms. In the present paper we
investigate the case in which social and non-social firms must decide the quantity to
produce before resolving demand uncertainty. In this decision context, the equilibria
to which the firms will eventually arrive depend on the firms attitude to risk. We
present an analysis of the equilibria for the various cases when one of the firms
incorporates the social responsibility objective.
The conclusion is that when a firm incorporates a social objective, new equilibria
can emerge. In all of them, irrespectively of the firm’s attitude to risk, the socially
responsible firm offers quantities greater than or equal to those offered if the firm
were a pure profit maximizer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the concept of equilib-
ria when firms value several objectives simultaneously is established. In Section 3 we
present our model of mixed duopoly under uncertainty in which one of the firms is a
pure profit maximizer and the other incorporates a social objective. The equilibria
to which the firms will eventually arrive depending on their attitude towards risk
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are identified in the various cases. The appendix contains a review of the results in
Caraballo et al. (2014) about the equilibria for pure profit maximizers firms which
exhibit the same risk attitude, together with the analysis of the cases of pure profit
maximizers firms that exhibit different risk attitudes.
2 Pareto equilibria with vector-valued utilities
We consider a two-person normal-form game with vector-valued utility func-
tions, G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}, where Ai is the set of strategies that agent i can adopt
and ui is a mapping ui : A1×A2 → IRmi , the vector-valued utility function of agent
i.
We adopt the term Pareto Equilibrium (PE ) to refer to the natural extension
of the concept of Nash equilibrium for these games with vector-valued utilities.
Definition 2.1. (q∗1, q∗2) is a Pareto Equilibrium for the game G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}
if /∃ q1 ∈ A1 such that u1(q1, q∗2) ≥ u1(q∗1, q∗2) with u1(q1, q∗2) 6= u1(q∗1, q∗2), and
/∃ q2 ∈ A2 such that u2(q∗1, q2) ≥ u2(q∗1, q∗2) with u2(q∗1, q2) 6= u2(q∗1, q∗2).
The set of Pareto Equilibria for G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2} is denoted as PE(G).
For i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, denote by Ri the correspondence which represents the
best response of agent i to the actions of agent j. In the case of vector-valued utilities,
the best response of one agent to an action of the other agent is not in general a
singleton, but a subset of its set of strategies, Ri(qj) ⊆ Ai: those strategies of agent
i, such that he does not improve his vector-valued utility by deviating from them. A
pair of strategies (q∗1, q∗2) is a Pareto Equilibrium for the game G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}
if and only if q∗i ∈ Ri(q∗j) for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
In the games we investigate in this paper the strategies refer to quantities, thus
Ai ⊆ IR+. Moreover, it is assumed that the total quantity the agents are able to
offer is bounded by a positive constant, that is Ai = [0, K
i] for i = 1, 2.
Example 2.2. As a first example, consider Firm 1 and Firm 2 as profit maximizers
which initially compete under Cournot assumptions. They face a linear demand
function p = α− γq, with α, γ > 0, have no fixed costs and their marginal costs are
equal to zero. In the Cournot game the profit maximizing objectives of the firms
are represented by ui(q1, q2) = qi(α− γ(q1 + q2)), i = 1, 2, and the pair of strategies
at equilibrium is (q∗1, q∗2) = ( α
3γ
, α
3γ
).
The case we want to analyze is when Firm 1 together with its profit maximizing
objective incorporates a social objective represented by u12(q
1, q2) = s(q1+q2), where
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s is an strictly increasing function in the total quantity, q = q1 + q2, up to a certain
value of q. It is assumed that Firm 1 takes into account the social objective as far
as positive profits are obtained. Therefore, the maximum value that q can attain
coincides with the market perfect competition quantity, that is, q = α
γ
. Above
this quantity, we can assign a negative value to the social objective, for instance
s(q) = −1.
The shaded area in Figure 1 represents the best responses of Firm 1 to the
actions of Firm 2. The perfect competition quantity is denoted by qpc. The Cournot
equilibrium quantities when both firms are profit maximizers are qjc and qic respec-
tively. Observe that when Firm 2 offers q2, Firm 1 can offer any quantity between
his best response in the Cournot game and the quantity which makes the total equal
to the perfect competition quantity, since by deviating from these strategies, Firm
1 will always improve one of its objectives an worsen the other. On the other hand,
the best response of Firm 2 to the actions of Firm 1 coincides with that of the
Cournot game. As a consequence, the set of Pareto equilibria of the extended game
is the intersection represented by the dark segment.
Figure 1. Best reponses and Pareto equilibria.
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) :
α
3γ
< q1 <
α
γ
, q2 =
α− γq1
2γ
}
.
That is to say, the effect of the incorporation of the social objective is that new
equilibria emerge in which the social responsible firm offers quantities greater that
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its Cournot quantity and the pure profit maximizer firm acts with its best response
a` la Cournot.
3 Mixed duopoly under uncertainty and attitudes
to risk
In a mixed duopoly two firms with different goals are considered. In the model
we investigate, one of the firms pursues a social objective in addition to profit
maximization, and the other firm is a pure profit maximizer.
Our model of mixed duopoly is the following: two firms producing homogeneous
commodities compete in quantities and face uncertain market demand since two
different future scenarios are possible. For simplicity we assume that they have no
fixed costs and their marginal costs are equal to zero.
The inverse demand function at scenario k, k = 1, 2, is given by p = αk − γkkq,
with αk, γk > 0. In our setting, firms make their output decision, q
1, q2, before the
uncertainty is resolved. For i = 1, 2, the benefit for firm i at scenario k is
Πik(q
1, q2) = qi(αk − γk(q1 + q2)).
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
α1
γ1
<
α2
γ2
, that is, the quantity of
perfect competition in the first scenario is lower than that of the second scenario.
One of the firms, say Firm 1, in addition to profit maximization pursues a
social objective, whose valuation increases with the total quantity in the market,
q = q1 + q2. A social responsibility objective is often modeled by means of a
percentage of the social consumers surplus, hence it increases with the square of the
total quantity. The results we present herein hold, provided that the social objective
function is increasing in the total quantity offered up to a certain value.
Hence, we represent this social objective function as u(q1, q2) = s(q1+q2), where
s is strictly increasing in the total quantity, q = q1 + q2, up to a certain value of q.
We assume that Firm 1 values the social objective as long as profits are positive.
Otherwise, that is, when the possibility of no making profits at some of the possible
scenarios exists, the firm does not take into account the social objective. Since, both
firms insure nonnegative profits in both scenarios for quantities below the perfect
competition quantity, q =
α1
γ1
, we can formalize this fact by setting u(q1, q2) =
s(q1 + q2) when q1 + q2 ≤ α1
γ1
, and u(q1, q2) = −1 when q1 + q2 > α1
γ1
.
XXII Jornadas de ASEPUMA y X Encuentro Internacional
Anales de ASEPUMA n 22:1302
7
Caraballo, M. A´ngeles; Ma´rmol, Amparo M.; Monroy, Luisa
In the present paper we investigate the case in which social and non-social
firms must decide the quantity to produce before resolving demand uncertainty.
In this decision context, the equilibria to which the firms will eventually arrive
depend on the firms attitude to risk. In what follows we present an analysis of
the equilibria for the various cases when one of the firms incorporates the social
responsibility objective. Interestingly, in some of the cases no equilibria exist for the
profit maximizing game. However, the incorporation of an objective reflecting social
responsibility may have as a consequence the existence of equilibria strategies.
For the sake of simplicity in the presentation, from all cases for profit maxi-
mizers studied in Caraballo et al. (2014), we select those that fulfill the following
assumptions.
1. 2α2
3γ2
< α1
γ1
.
2. 2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
1
3
(α1
γ1
+ α2
γ2
) .
3.1 Firms with identical risk attitude
3.1.1 Conservative firms
In the case in which both firms are conservative, that is, when they exhibit
extreme risk aversion, the utility of the firms related to the benefits is represented
by the worst benefit obtained in the scenarios. Accordingly, in an equilibrium of
the pure profit maximizing game, conservative firms obtain quantities such that no
individual deviation produces an improvement in the minimum benefit.
In the mixed duopoly model the vector-valued utility function for Firm 1 is:
u1 = (u1c , u) where u
1
c(q
1, q2) = Min{Π11(q1, q2),Π12(q1, q2)} and u(q1, q2) = s(q1+q2).
The real-valued utiliy of Firm 2 is u2c(q
1, q2) = Min{Π21(q1, q2),Π22(q1, q2)}.
Given a game with vector-valued utilities, G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}, the reaction
set of agent i, R(i), contains the pairs of strategies formed by all actions of agent
j and the corresponding best responses of agent i. Thus, the reaction set for a
conservative Firm 1 which values both the social and the profit maximizing objective,
R(1) = {(R1(q2), q2) : q2 ∈ A2}, is described as:
R(1) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ :
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 ≤ q
1 + q2 ≤ α1
γ1
}
∩{(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : 2q1 + q2 ≥ α1} .
The shaded area in the Figure 2 represents this set. The best response of the
conservative pure profit maximizer Firm 2 to the actions of Firm 1 can be seen in the
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Appendix (Subsection 1.1). As a consequence, the pair of strategies on the broken
black line are the Pareto equilibria of this mixed duopoly. Thus, the set of equilibria
in this case is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 ,
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1(γ1 − γ2) < q
1 <
α1γ1 − 2α2γ1 + α1γ2
γ1(γ1 − γ2)
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
,
α1γ1 − 2α2γ1 + α1γ2
γ1(γ1 − γ2) < q
1 <
α1
γ1
.
}
.
Figure 2. Equilibria for conservative firms.
3.1.2 Optimistic firms
The other extreme case in terms of risk attitude of the firms is the situation
when the two firms take into account only the best of the results they can obtain
with regard to profits. The utility of optimistic firms is now given by:
uiop(q
1, q2) = Max{Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)}.
This optimistic utility function coincides with Πi1 when (γ1 − γ2)(q1 + q2) ≤
α1 − α2, and with Πi2 otherwise.
The reaction set of an optimistic Firm 1 can be defined as follows
R(1) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 ≤
α1
γ1
}
∩ {(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : 2q1 + q2 ≥ α1, q2 ≤ qm}
∩{(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : 2q1 + q2 ≥ α2, q2 ≥ qm}.
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where
qm =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
1√
γ1γ2
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1 − γ2 .
Regarding the set of equilibria of the mixed duopoly, three cases have to be consid-
ered, which depend on the relative position of qm.
a) For qm <
α1
3γ1
the equilibria are:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
,
α2
3γ2
< q1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
b) For α1
3γ1
< qm <
α2
3γ2
, the set of equilibria is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
,
α1
3γ1
< q1 < qm
}
∪{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
,
α2
3γ2
< q1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
.
c) For qm >
α2
3γ2
, the set of equilibria is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
,
α1
3γ1
< q1 < qm
}
∪{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
, qm < q
1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
.
Case b) is represented in Figure 3. Note that for these values of the parame-
ters the equilibria in the pure profit maximizing game consist of the two Cournot
equilibria. With the new social objective the set of Pareto equilibria is expanded to
those pairs of strategies shown in the figure in solid black.
Figure 3. Equilibria for optimistic firms.
XXII Jornadas de ASEPUMA y X Encuentro Internacional
Anales de ASEPUMA n 22:1302
10
Equilibria for socially responsible firms
3.2 Firms with different risk attitudes
When the attitude towards risk of both firms is different we have to distinguish
the following two cases:
1. Firm 1 (the socially responsible) is conservative, and Firm 2 (pure profit max-
imizer) is optimistic. Three subcases can be distinguished. The first two
correspond to those in which equilibria always exist when firms are pure profit
maximizer, while in the third case no equilibrium exists for pure profit maxi-
mizer duopolists (see appendix).
a) If qm ≤ 23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 , the set of equilibria is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
,
2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
< q1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
.
b) If qm ≥
(
2(α1−α2
γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1
)
≥ (2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
), the set of equilibria is given by:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
, 2(
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 )−
α1
γ1
< q1 < qm
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
, qm < q
1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
.
c) When 2(α1−α2
γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1 > qm > (23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 ) there is no equilibrium for pure
maximizers firms. However, when the new objective is considered, Pareto
equilibria may exist for certain values of the parameters. If qm ≤ 2α1γ1 − α2γ2
the set of equilibria is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α2 − γ2q1
2γ2
, qm < q
1 <
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
}
.
Obviously, if qm >
2α1
γ1
− α2
γ2
no equilibrium exists. Figure 4 represents the
two different situations which can occur in this case. On the left-hand
side, the equilibria the firms can attain belong to a segment. On the
right-hand side no equilibrium exists.
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qi
qj
qpc
Ri(qj)
Rj(qi)
qm
qi
qj
qpc
Ri(qj)
Rj(qi)
qm
Figure 4. Firm 1 is conservative, Firm 2 is optimistic.
2. In this case, Firm 1 is optimistic and Firm 2 is conservative. We can distinguish
the same situations as in case 1.
a) If qm ≤ 23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 , the set of equilibria is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
,
2
3
α2
γ2
− 1
3
α1
γ1
< q1 <
α1
γ1
}
.
b) If qm ≥
(
2(α1−α2
γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1
)
≥ (2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
), the set of equilibria is given by:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 ,
α1
γ1
− α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 < q
1 < 2
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
α1
γ1
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
, 2
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
α1
γ1
< q1 <
α1
γ1
}
.
c) When 2(α1−α2
γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1 > qm > (23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 ), no equilibrium for pure maxi-
mizers firms exists. In this case, unlike the situation where both firms are
profit maximizers or the social firm is conservative and the profit maxi-
mizer is optimistic, it can be assured that equilibria always exist and the
set of equilibria can be described as follows:
XXII Jornadas de ASEPUMA y X Encuentro Internacional
Anales de ASEPUMA n 22:1302
12
Equilibria for socially responsible firms
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
α1 − γ1q1
2γ1
, 2
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
α1
γ1
< q1 <
α1
γ1
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 ,
1√
γ1γ2
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1 − γ2 < q
1 < 2
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
α1
γ1
}
.
This set is represented in Figure 5.
qi
qj
qpc
Ri(qj)
Rj(qi)
qm
Figure 5. Equilibria for optimistic Firm 1, conservative Firm 2.
Example 3.1. Consider the Cournot game under uncertainty in which the demand
functions at scenario 1 and 2 are respectively: p = 10 − q and p = 5 − (7/20)q. In
this case α1 = 10, γ1 = 1, α2 = 5, γ2 = 7/20. Following Theorem 3.9.c) in Caraballo
et al. (2014), since the quantity qm =
100
√
7/20−30
13
√
7/20
is located between the Cournot
equilibria of both markets, the optimistic equilibria are the Cournot equilibrium
of each market: (10/3, 10/3) and (100/21, 100/21). The conservative equilibria are
those Pareto equilibria (q1, q2), such that q1+q2 = 100/13. In the set of conservative
equilibria, the quantity each firm produces varies from 30/13 to 70/13.
Since qm =
100
√
7/20−30
13
√
7/20
, α1−α2
γ1−γ2 =
100
13
, 1
3
(α1
γ1
+ α2
γ2
) = 170
21
, (2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
) = 40
21
and
2(α1−α2
γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1 = 7013 , this example corresponds to case c) in which, when firms show
different attitudes to risk, no equilibrium exists.
If Firm 1 has a second objective and Firm 2 is a profit maximizer, we distinguish
the following cases
XXII Jornadas de ASEPUMA y X Encuentro Internacional
Anales de ASEPUMA n 22:1302
13
Caraballo, M. A´ngeles; Ma´rmol, Amparo M.; Monroy, Luisa
1. The case in which both firms are conservative corresponds to a situation as
represented in Figure 2. The set of PE is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 =
100
13
,
30
13
< q1 <
70
13
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
10− q1
2
,
70
13
< q1 < 10
}
.
2. The situation in which both firms are optimistic is represented in Figure 3.
The set of PE is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
10− q1
2
,
10
30
< q1 < qm
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
50
7
− q
1
2
,
100
21
< q1 <
40
7
}
.
3. If Firm 1 is conservative and Firm 2 is optimistic, as in Figure 4 (left), the set
of PE is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
50
7
− q
1
2
, qm < q
1 <
40
7
}
.
4. When Firm 1 is optimistic and Firm 2 is conservative as in Figure 5, the set
of PE is:
PE(G) =
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q2 =
10− q1
2
,
70
13
< q1 < 10
}
∪
{
(q1, q2) ∈ IR2+ : q1 + q2 =
100
13
,
√
20
7
30
13
< q1 <
70
13
}
.
4 Conclusions
An alternative analysis of the effect of strategic corporate social responsibility
in a mixed duopoly under demand uncertainty, which differs from those of existing
in the literature, is presented. In our model, the social firm faces a bi-objective
utility function, which reflects profit maximizing under uncertainty, together with
the pursuit of a social goal. We have shown that the set of equilibria of the mixed
duopoly expands the equilibria of the profit maximizer strategic model. In all the
new equilibria which emerge, irrespectively of the firm attitude to risk, the socially
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responsible firm offers quantities greater than or equal to those offered in the classic
pure profit maximizer duopoly.
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5 Appendix: Equilibria for profit maximizers un-
der uncertainty and risk attitudes
In this appendix we summarize some results extracted from Caraballo et al.
(2014) and we present the analysis of the equilibria in new situations. In Caraballo
et al. a normal form game with vector-valued utility functions is considered in order
to analyse a Cournot duopoly under demand uncertainty in a context in which two
future scenarios are possible. The inverse demand function at scenario k, k = 1, 2, is
given by p = αk − γkq, with αk, γk > 0. It is assumed that firms have no fixed costs
and their marginal costs are equal to zero. The firms make their output decision,
q1, q2, before the uncertainty is resolved.
For i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, denote rik : Aj → IR as the function which represents
the best response of agent i to the actions of agent j at scenario k,
rik(q
j) =
αk − γkqj
2γk
.
We next present the reaction functions and the set of equilibria when firms
show extreme attitudes to risk and the parameters of the demand function fulfill the
following assumptions:
1. α2
2γ2
< α1
γ1
.
2. 2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
1
3
(α1
γ1
+ α2
γ2
) .
Assumption 1 implies that the set of equilibria of the Cournot game under
uncertainty when both firms are profit maximizers are positive strategies. The
second assumption implies that the intersection of the demand functions is between
the Cournot equilibrium of market 1 and the equilibrium quantity when firms assume
different demand function when taking their decisions.
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5.1 Firms with identical risk attitude
Conservative firms
In this case the reaction function for Firm 1 (symmetrically for Firm 2) is
defined as follows:
r1k(q
2) =

α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 − q
2 if q2 < α1−α2
γ1−γ2 − q1,
α1 − γ1q2
2γ1
otherwise.
And the set of equilibria is given by:
Ec =
{
(q1, q2) : q1 + q2 =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 ,
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1(γ1 − γ2) < q
1 <
α1γ1 − 2α2γ1 + α1γ2
γ1(γ1 − γ2)
}
.
Figure 6 shows the reaction functions for both firms and the set of equilibria.
The dashed line corresponds to firm 1 and the dotted line corresponds to Firm 2.
Firm 1
Firm 2
↵1 ↵2
 1  2
⇧2
⇧1
Ec
Figure 6. Equilibria for conservative profit maximizer firms.
Optimistic firms
In this case the reaction function for Firm 1 (symmetrically for Firm 2) is
defined as follows:
r1k(q
1) =

α1 − γ1q2
2γ1
if q2 ≤ qm
α2 − γ2q2
2γ2
otherwise.
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where qm =
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 − 1√γ1γ2
α2γ1−α1γ2
γ1−γ2 .
The possible equilibria reduce to the Cournot strategies in both scenarios. De-
pending of the values of the parameters, there may exist an unique optimistic equi-
librium which coincides with the Cournot equilibrium of one of the scenarios, or
both Cournot equilibria of the scenarios are optimistic equilibria.
Eop ⊆
{(
α1
3γ1
,
α1
3γ1
)
,
(
α2
3γ2
,
α2
3γ2
)}
.
Figure 7 shows the reaction functions for both firms and the set of equilibria
when qm is below the Cournot equilibrium of market 1 (left) and when qm is between
the Cournot equilibrium of markets 1 and 2 (right) 1. The dashed line corresponds
to Firm 1 and the dotted line corresponds to Firm 2.
Firm 1
Firm 2
↵1 ↵2
 1  2
⇧1
⇧2
Eop
qm
qm
Firm 1
Firm 2
↵1 ↵2
 1  2
⇧1
⇧2
Eop
qm
qm
Eop
Figure 7. Equilibria for optimistic profit maximizer firms.
5.2 Firms with different risk attitudes
In addition to the results in Caraballo et al.(2014), we present now the analysis
of the case where firms show different attitudes to risk. Let us consider that Firm 1
is conservative and Firm 2 is optimistic. In order to obtain the set of equilibria we
take into account the corresponding reaction functions.
1. If qm ≤ 23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 , then
Ec,op =
{(
2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
,
2
3
α2
γ2
− 1
3
α1
γ1
)}
1if qm is above the Cournot equilibrium of market 2, the unique equilibrium will be the Cournot
equilibrium of market 1.
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2. If qm ≥ 2(α1−α2γ1−γ2 )− α1γ1 ≥ (23 α1γ1 − 13 α2γ2 ), then
Ec,op =
{(
2(
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 )−
α1
γ1
,
α1
γ1
− α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2
)}
Figure 8 shows both cases. The dashed line corresponds to Firm 1 and the dotted
line corresponds to Firm 2.
Figure 8. Equilibria for profit maximizers with different attitudes to risk.
Nevertheless, unlike cases where both firms show the same attitude to risk,
when they exhibit opposite attitude to risk, there are cases for which no equilibrium
exists as represented in Figure 9. This is the case when
2
(
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2
)
− α1
γ1
> qm >
(
2
3
α1
γ1
− 1
3
α2
γ2
)
.
Figure 9. No equilibrium for profit maximizers with different attitudes to risk.
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